Wednesday, April 20, 2022

Food shortage, luring Ukraine to counter-attack Russia, mass-cleansing of the General Staff, plan for Odessa - 17th letter from the Wind of Change inside the FSB

My translation of the 17th #FSBletters from the #WindofChange inside the FSB to Vladimir Osechkin. Dated 4/18. Topics: Global food shortage, luring Ukraine to counter-attack Russia, impending mass-cleansing of the General Staff, Odessa, chaos surrounding the missing & economy. Please share far & wide.

Please listen to this audio as it explains the context and the genesis of the #FSBletters. It will help you understand the prism through which these letters are to be read. You will understand in real human terms why #WindofChange writes to Vladimir.

As always, my comments for clarification are in (parenthesis). #WindofChange's parenthesis are in [brackets]. So, let's roll:

“I’ll say it upfront – I can’t provide 100% accurate prognosis because the situation is so dynamic that it’s difficult to keep up. Besides, there’s often a rift between plans & actualization.

This explains why there have been no direct explosions of residential buildings [so far], confined to shelling by "Ukrainian" helicopters/DRG of certain vacant areas and non-residential buildings.

I will try to break the letter into themes [or rather, I will try to collect a number of themes in the letter].

1. Using migrants for blackmail and the unexpected flip side of the coin.

As I wrote earlier, the main bet in the protracted war with the Western world is the use of migrants as blackmail (against the West): by knocking out Ukraine's grain exports and refusing to export potash fertilizers, Russia effectively launches a scenario of hunger riots and widespread migration from developing countries.

In theory, the window of opportunity for blackmail is as follows: give more grain to developing countries - reduce the flow of migrants. Naturally, all this could be in response to mutual concessions from the West.

But already we are facing opposition from the West: almost all developing countries have taken a neutral position in the war with Ukraine. In the current geopolitical situation, this can be credited to Russia. But such a game of hunger [and Ukraine's fuel reserves and grain export logistics are now being destroyed very systematically and precisely] can turn developing countries against us much earlier than we reach the point of possible blackmail. And the West is actively conducting this "explanatory work" right now.

2. Belgorod Oblast.

In the current situation, there are political decisions and there are military decisions. From the military point of view, allowing Ukraine a "sudden" offensive with a significant advance on Belgorod Oblast is unacceptable.

From the political point of view – quite possible.

At the moment, we are fighting internally to push through an option where, in the event of a serious military defeat in the Donbass direction, we can give the AFU (Armed Forces of Ukraine) a "corridor to enter" the Belgorod region. The corridor would look like a total surrender of a piece of territory, which would allow to:

- Demonstrate a picture of the risk of war on Russian territory; (to the Russian population)

- Move toward total mobilization without regard to what problems it will bring;

- Create a "terrorist precedent" in all the territory controlled by the AFU [they (Russians) plan to give them only part of the region].

This could block the "Bucha factor" for the outside observer, at the same time distracting the internal observer from the problems in the economy. The main thing is to get them in - explosions and all the other delights will be in abundance, and the military knuckleheads from the General Staff will be made responsible for this.

This cannot be done with Crimea, precisely for political reasons. The military is against such approaches in principle, but the military is a separate issue; they are now acting as losers to some extent.

3. Military. The question of corruption in the army gets zero attention until after the end of the war. This does not mean that everybody has forgotten about everything - even investigations are being carefully carried out, but for now they will not touch on the old stuff. It is left for after the war.

Taking care of the so-called "unreliables" (those in the Russian military that do not support Putin) is much more urgent now, especially in the command staff. It is the military that now represents the main threat to stability [not my personal assessment - I am stating the assessment of the Service (FSB) and the country's leadership], and the scale of the threat is growing, as they say, both wide and deep.

The number of unreliables is growing, the level of radicalization of sentiments is increasing. Military counterintelligence alone will not suffice here - the military is not a closed system – its contacts [and a certain political weight] penetrate deep into society. Further, the military, by definition, has both the organizational structure and the human resources, as well as the necessary foundation.

Right now, the situation with them is infinitely far from a riot, but in the case of the expected "military contingencies" you can get a bunch of very adult problems.

I don't know what the final decision on them will be, but I estimate the likelihood of "isolation" through both direct imprisonment and dismissal with all the problems written off on the dismissed as high.

The fact that dossiers are now being prepared for the lion's share of those on the command staff to put them in jail with a beautiful pretext - I confirm.

Before they give the order to roll back the military operation [the reasons are not important], they will have to clean the "unreliable command staff", sometimes to a bloody crust, and sometimes even to the white bone.

4. Ukraine, the southern front. From the leadership's point of view, Mykolaiv is in some ways becoming as much of an irritant as Mariupol. So far there is no clear solution, and the cost of military pressure is prohibitively high. The calculation that Mykolaiv will break prior to the advancing (Russian) forces will break belongs to the same lists of calculations regarding capture of Kiev in 3 days.

But there is Odessa. From the military point of view, everything there is also extremely sad for our side - now we can say that the storm that blocked the landing earlier did not so much save Odessa as it saved our marines. The military counterintelligence of the Ukrainians [and NATO helps them - this is a fact] is a separate misfortune for us. Or rather, it is a misfortune for the military, which had its own plans to eliminate a number of key individuals. But there aren’t any particular direct military solutions there: the obviousness of the failure of a possible breakthrough operation to Transnistria is now apparent even to the most desperate.

In Odessa, however, they (Russian side) are betting on chaotization on all fronts except the military. Fact is the counterintelligence of the Odessa SBU (Ukrainian Security Service) is the weakest of the regional ones in Ukraine. In addition, the economic management of the Odessa region is conducted on the residual principle, i.e., it is not conducted at all.

That is why it is Odessa that will bear the brunt of the disruption: lists of names that are not on the guarded list, but whose simultaneous elimination could cause social and political chaos, are now being prepared.

The task is not to eliminate influential "enemies of Russia" - the task is to completely chaoticize the local space, to rock the situation and to start a mechanism of conflicts between everyone.

Our people (in the FSB) have already felt out Odessa: sabotage against military targets is almost unrealizable, but everything else is almost without resistance, and the local SBU is incapable of dealing with issues unrelated to smuggling and customs.

5. Kadyrov. He lurks and continues to establish his game. We are also starting to move on him from different sides, he understands that. Who, to whom, and how will do what in the end is still a trick question.

6. Missing Persons (Russian military losses in Ukraine). This problem will rise to full prominence after the war, but its scale is insanely large. The missing are now the main category in terms of current losses, with the numbers jumping around so much that the real situation is unknown.

Modern warfare is such that the heavy weapons will sometimes make it impossible to find physical bodies.

Many are indeed dead and just not evacuated. Some in captivity, some escaped, some have lost contact and may still return. The picture in this sense is the same for all agencies.

The Ukrainian side is conducting active work to establish a list of identities of those they have captured.

But no one knows anything (in Russia) about the overwhelming majority of the missing people - this data is classified and concealed like the top secret of the country.

Recognition of the dead will be made with extreme reluctance, and one should not look for malicious intent here: if there is a chance that a person may be found alive (if Russia jumps the gun on recognizing the missing as dead), then military bureaucrats will have a headache on their hands. Let us take the most cynical example:

the relatives will be paid compensation as is if the person is deceased, but the person will return, for example, with a serious wound, after having been found somewhere in captivity.

Ask the relatives to "return the money they received" and reclassify everything?

It’s cynical, but for the bureaucratic system it is also unsolvable, which means that even after the war people will still be on the list of the missing for a very, very long time. And there are thousands and thousands of people missing.

7. Overall. Nabiullina (Head of the Russian Central Bank) has already confirmed aloud what I wrote in the very first letters: by the end of May we are ending the "good old days" and moving into a new economic model. Which does not yet exist, which has not yet been invented, but for which we will pay a fantastic price for trying to create.

Import warehouses will be depleted of everything accumulated in the pre-war period by that time (end of May), whether the government will risk unlocking the strategic reserves - we wonder ourselves.

If you unpack it (the strategic reserves), up to another six months of time appears. That phase (the extra 6 months) would be on the level of the early '90s. And then... I don't even want to talk about it. And there is no point in looking that far ahead: earlier we tried to plan for years ahead, now it would be a success if we could predict a month out.

(END OF TRANSLATION of the 17th #FSBletters from the #WindofChange)

Monday, April 11, 2022

Consequences of large-scale mobilization, what Russia plans to do next, Bucha genocide, Kadyrov, terror attacks - 14th letter from the Wind of Change inside the FSB

My translation of the 14th #FSBletters from the #WindofChange inside the FSB to Vladimir Osechkin. Dated 4/4. Topics: Consequences of large-scale mobilization, what Russia plans to do next, Bucha genocide, Kadyrov, terror attacks. Please share far & wide. 

Please listen to this audio as it explains the context and the genesis of the #FSBletters. It will help you understand the prism through which these letters are to be read. You will understand in real human terms why #WindofChange writes to Vladimir.


As always, my comments for clarification are in (parenthesis). #WindofChange's parenthesis are in [brackets]. So, let's roll:


For all the dynamism of the situation and new events, trend is the same - total violence in all directions.


But I would like to focus on the subject of mobilization specifically - it is now becoming almost a cornerstone from the point of view of the top leadership.


On the one side, it’s silly to discuss any prospects of war: Military failure is already evident, and the "brave offensive from Kiev towards Donetsk via Belarus" is perceived by all as an unambiguous escape. (Referring to retreat from Kyiv to Belarus by the Russian battalions)


The ОДКБ (CSTO – Russian version of NATO partners including Belarus) will not give troops - even direct terrorist attacks on their territory with successful attribution to the Ukrainians, and this task cannot be carried out by morons from the GRU (Russian Military Intelligence), is far from being a solution to the problem. Although work is being done in this direction...


Now to the problems that prevent the start of large-scale mobilization in Russia.

1. Mobilization in the form of agitation to sign the contract is going on, but the result is absolutely useless.

2. The status of special operation will have to be scrapped - the legal justification for a "special operation" involving mobilized people is nonsense. Even lunacy must have limits. Hence the next point.

3. A transition to total martial law would kill the economy. It will be like imposing sanctions from within against yourself. Mobilization will have to take place for a long time: you cannot just take a man, dress him, and send him away. Even if he served once. Just the training will take 2-3 months, and that is very minimal. There’s a type of mobilization when trained military personnel, including those in support roles, are sent to the front, and they are replaced, especially those on extra duty in the units, by the mobilized, but there are already conscripts who have replaced contract soldiers under this scheme.

4. "What if it doesn't work?" This question was left unanswered when they planned to take Kiev in 3 days. Now we can finally approach the situation from a critical point of view. And what if the population responds by resisting mobilization? The choice here is simple: draconian measures to intimidate anyone and everyone who dares to squirm, otherwise almost everyone will run. But if there is still resistance to mobilization? Draconian measures, if they are absolutely widespread, will turn potential fighters into a real army, aimed instead against the authorities. And to counteract that would require diversion of serious forces against the refusers. Who are, again, in significantly short supply. We’ve already played around with fake statistics, and we are stuffed. Now the task is to get real statistics on the expected number of refusals for different types of mobilization.


5. Technical capabilities: Mobilization is a very complex process, especially on the anticipated scale. There is already skepticism about the military's "expectation reports," now there is an attempt to assess the country's technical readiness for such a large-scale mobilization as covertly, promptly and adequately as possible.


This is a monumental managerial burden on all services, where a failure in one area would lead to a failure of the entire system. It is necessary to balance the available people for the required staff vacancies, and the staffing needs should be calculated as accurately as possible. In general, it is not clear yet how ready we are. And it's very possible that we won't be able to find out before the process begins.


6. The transition to an unequivocally protracted war requires a complete change in the economic and political approach inside the country. Here, even the usual reforms didn't work out, but to transition the entire Russian economy into fundamentally new conditions in a few days or weeks - it is an impossible management task. I don’t know it’s an appropriate project, but even if it were, it is impossible to implement all the plans in a short period of time without critical errors. I don’t even know what to compare it to - a construction of a new economic system for a nation. We can't figure this one out yet.


7. Negotiating with our hands tied: If you start mobilizing, then negotiations become moot for months to come. This can make the situation much worse, although how it’ll be “worse" and what else might happen is an interesting question. Only a fool would think that "it will not get worse.” Even if we do not see an option for worse, it’s definitely there. And to negotiate under conditions of mobilization - everyone understands that it’s a bluff.


8. Divergence of goals and capabilities: If we go into full mobilization and a protracted war, then a military victory over Ukraine [hypothetical] will accomplish nothing. In the current world we will be simply wiped out, there will be no chance to escape peacefully. So, if we do take this step (large-scale mobilization), then in order to enter negotiations to achieve the desired result, it will be necessary to create pressure on Europe at minimum. With a corresponding capture of eastern part of Europe and a direct threat to capture the rest. But these are – objectives. But the opportunities may shrink to the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Here is the difficulty: capturing Sloviansk or Kramatorsk is not the same as threatening to go to Berlin or Paris.


9. It was not for nothing that I once compared the current campaign to the war against Japan a century ago. Back then, too, we played around with getting a "small triumph.” Analogies repeat themselves, and trying to cover the problem with human resources provides no guarantee of the desired result.


But risks reveal themselves. In modern warfare, quantitative indicators are completely inferior to qualitative ones. A large contingent is needed primarily for logistics and control of occupied territories. If we focus the strike in the direction of Donbass, then the "war with flesh" will also have no effect here: over all these years, Ukraine has created solid lines of fortifications there, and it is easier to organize supplies for them there than for our side. And our large forces in the attack can turn into great losses and risk, as the classics would say, "transformation of an imperialist war into a civil war.” I exaggerate, of course, but only in part: the risk of internal rebellion from significant failures skyrockets.


10. It’s not quite clear what exactly is required for a guaranteed victory from our [Russian] side.

On February 24, we used all our prepared tricks: the surprise factor, clearing the approaches to Kherson, the head of the Kherson SBU was recruited in advance and carried out this mission, utilized the Belarusian direction, the entire mass of missile attacks, the morale of the army [was a head higher than now], using the direction through Chernobyl [no one expected us there, and it’s even clear why we weren’t expected there].


What exactly do we need to do today to turn the tide? What can we use now that we haven't used before? Sheer numbers in ground forces that lack proper training – doesn’t appear to be something reliable. This is a topic for the military, but so far there has been little clarity.


In general, mobilization under such conditions is far from being the solution. For Ukraine, the withdrawal of our troops exposed the pathway to Belarus - if the Ukrainians had invaded there, it would have been a chance to turn to the CSTO again. But it wasn’t something we could hope for. (Meaning Russian command knew Ukrainian forces wouldn’t go into Belarus to chase the retreating Russian forces.)


Militarily, to the point of new understanding, we need to wait for two results: whether the attempt to encircle the Donbass position of the AFU (Armed Forces of Ukraine) will be successful for the Russian army, and whether it will be possible to make a breakthrough to Transnistria via Odessa.

This second option is military madness, but Moldova, judging by their statements, is frightened and fully believes this.


Now for the current problems: Bucha is a problem that was not anticipated, but nor is it a surprise. No command would ever order such a blatant extermination of civilians, but in the face of low control and the circumstances... partly predictable. The situation could escalate to such a level that the consequences are very, very hard to overestimate. (The West’s response to the genocide in Bucha.)


There are no good solutions here - what is left is the need to jump out of the situation. The key technical point is to try at all costs to seize the initiative in the information confrontation.


Be the first to demand an investigation, demand an international commission, they provide their findings - the pattern of behavior of the bureaucratic machine never changes, in fact we have "Boeing #2" in terms of effect and influence. (Reference to MH17 Boeing-777 shot down by Russia in 2014 over Ukraine, murdering 298 civilians from 10 countries)

It’s impossible to rule out our own punishment for those responsible for what happened, and it’s impossible to allow such actions to become public. The point of shifting attention and blame - Ukrainian officials and politicians from cities occupied by Russian forces publicly and directly collaborated. (This will be the false narrative sold to the Russian public & Ukrainian population in occupied territories to explain Bucha genocide.)


If they and/or their families (Ukrainian officials/politicians in cities currently occupied by Russian forces) are exterminated in an extremely demonstrative and brutal manner, the responsibility in any case will fall on the Ukrainian side. (So goes the current Kremlin thinking on how to sell the Bucha genocide to the Russian population & Ukrainian population in occupied territories.)


From an informational standpoint, we'll get a chance to shift attention - theoretically.

Politically, we risk losing the loyalty of the population (inside Ukraine in occupied cities), which is already afraid to openly support Russia, and there are very few of them there now.


But our people began to literally play their moves in advance, patching up the existing gaps and not thinking about what will come out of it later. So, I allow this as a possibility.


Kadyrov: (Inside Chechnya) He understands what will happen to him if he presses the "stop" button on the war. And it appears he has decided to go for broke. We'll soon see. In any case, there is no more unanimity in the country (Chechnya) - the war party and the peace party are already approaching the point of direct conflict, and the arbitrator is nowhere to be seen. The spillover of foreign war into domestic war under such conditions is very real.


Everything can go belly-up at any moment (in Russia). The threat of terrorist attacks is at maximum (both false flag & orchestrated by Russian civilian fanatics who support the war). Everywhere. Control over the situation is at a critically low level, or has been lost altogether. Almost everywhere. No one knows what will happen next.


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Sunday, April 10, 2022

On Nuclear weapons, WMDs, Information Warfare, the SBU, Zelenskyy, and domestic false-flag terror attacks in Russia - 9th letter from the Wind of Change inside the FSB

My translation of the 9th #FSBletters from the #WindofChange inside the FSB to Vladimir Osechkin. Dated 3/17. Topics: Nuclear weapons, WMDs, Information Warfare, SBU (Ukrainian Security Services), and domestic false flag terror attacks. Please share far & wide.

Please listen to this audio as it explains the context and the genesis of the #FSBletters. It will help you understand the prism through which these letters are to be read. You will understand in real human terms why #WindofChange writes to Vladimir.

As always, my comments for clarification are in (parenthesis). #WindofChange's parenthesis are in [brackets]. So, let's roll:

“Vladimir, [REDACTED] It may seem that sometimes I avoid making straightforward, unambiguous statements and assessments - this is a necessary professional tactic. (To prevent blowing his cover)

Apparently, there is no tendency so bad that it did not carry even worse, but partly unforeseeable, options. Let me start with the worst: the risks of terrorist threats are increasing rapidly.

First of all, a disclaimer: even when one of the special services is involved in real provocations, this does not categorically mean that everyone in the performing special service is aware of everything. Information is compartmentalized away from uninvolved colleagues in every way possible, just like it is kept everyone else.

Regardless of who is committing the provocation and why, a number of specialized units are intentionally not looking for the culprits - other specialized units are tasked with that, who also can and should not be put on notice if the provocation was ours.

For some departments and specialists, it is important to convey/report information [not to find the perpetrator], the reaction of the external and internal environment, the elimination of risks and the search for maximum pragmatism in the emerging situation. Here I am being very careful to lead up to the fact that it is naive to believe that if, for example, our employees are involved in a provocation, then all employees are aware of it.

The Tochka-U missile attack on Donetsk was supposed to be "evidence of genocide on the part of Ukraine.”

According to a number of signs and facts independent of each other in this tragedy, it is practically a certainty that it was not Kiev that was behind the launch. But for a number of reasons, I am simply morally not ready to deconstruct this story into its components - I am sure that other experts will be able to do so without difficulty. Understanding this missile strike will also help to understand further prospects of the risk of terrorist attacks.

On the purely military subject, I will try to be as concise as possible: the existing forces and resources are insufficient for even a theoretical takeover of not just Ukraine, but even key cities. There aren’t enough forces even for complete encirclement, let alone an assault.

Thus, the information landscape is already becoming, technically speaking, extremely unacceptable.

Russia has weapons that have not yet been deployed, but there are problems with their use. A local nuclear strike will not solve the military problem, but will rather add problems. Attempts to threaten prior to such a strike can be made, but if the strike is actually made, there are gigantic risks.

Although the situation is now somewhere beyond logic and common sense, I still hope that outright foolishness will not be committed. A massive nuclear strike: Even if we assume that it is technically possible, that all the links of the chain follow all the orders, which I don't believe is the case anymore, it still doesn't make sense. Such a strike would hit everyone. And we would also be on the receiving end.

Non-nuclear superpower warheads - Again, the main problem is that this war is not an early to mid-century war with a solid line of fortifications. Who is to be hit? Kiev?

The shock wave from such an explosion will destroy the neutrality of all other countries - India, China, the Arab world, Latin America, along with actual homes. And we would have to strike with absolute "certainly," taking into account that Ukraine's air defense may well shoot down some [who knows which] of the launched charges, and "to launch and fail to strike" is to erase our military reputation to zero.

And if you just launch a multiple of warheads (#WindofChange still speaking about non-nuclear), then it is time to start looking for justification for the term "genocide" at least for the domestic consumer (Russian public). But here I rather believe in an attempted "strike of intimidation" rather than an attack on Kiev with an attempt to wipe it out.

There are, of course, the "Sunburners," but there are nuances with them. (#WindofChange is referring to TOS-1 thermobaric warheads)

TOS is a vulnerable machine, and it has to be guarded by a large force. In Syria, there was an unpleasant incident with the destruction of a TOC - the detonation is enough to destroy its own rear and all in the cover. Tested, that was sufficient.

And the Sunburners would still have to be transported to Kiev, at the risk of turning the entire column into dust after just one successful hit. A massive UAV attack, a lone artillery volley, an ambush - one hit on one particular vehicle and the result would be a monumentally negative one. All this forces us to look for other solutions. In this regard, Mariupol is being turned into a "show of force and intimidation" - in the hope that this example will be perceived in other cities as the need to flee or surrender.

The side effects are visible to the naked eye: obliteration of a big city into dust will raise questions even from internal audience (Russian public but also military, security services, etc.).

Here, a so-called "Nazi terrorist attack" could serve as a very big distraction. In addition, the "Nazi terrorist attack" [I am using the work vocabulary here, rather than giving my assessment] provides an opportunity to justify a much longer stay of Russian troops on Ukrainian territory, and a possible withdrawal, whether voluntary or forced, could be explained by the threat of "Nazi terrorist attacks" in response to loss of Russian control.

And there is also a reason to take control of critical infrastructure (in Ukraine) - this is already a bargaining chip in future negotiations. The most cynical is the question of possible "Nazi terrorist attacks" in Russia.

This is where the FSB is the most uninterested party in this. First, the destabilization of the situation (from a false flag domestic terror attack) can easily override "mobilization psychosis.”

Second, in any case, the FSB's task is to prevent this from happening, so such a terrorist attack in the late stages of the war puts the Service in the crosshairs for internal criticism, with the mandatory search for the perpetrators.

Incidentally, had Reichstag been a central powder warehouse, it would unlikely to have caught fire in the 1930s. In that sense, our whole country is a big gunpowder warehouse, and imitations don't work much anymore - the limit was successfully exhausted before the operation began.

This does not negate the fact that in addition to the FSB, as it is very fashionable to release all the dogs on us (Russian saying that means to place blame), there are other services and agencies.

We also have enough hot-heads among the civilians who, in the name of advancing the good (sarcasm) cause of this war, might well try to "push" the (terror) plot on the whole country – it’d already be worthwhile (for the FSB) to monitor them.

But in other security services that belong to the military, they think in military terms, and have their own logic. To them, such a development of the plot could appear highly advantageous. Concurrently, we are witnessing a craving for violence in society.

And due to culmination of factors, the risks of terrorist strikes have reached a new level, both for Ukraine and Russia. Terrorist attacks on the territory of Ukraine may be an attempt to "pressure the West," or take the form hidden behind man-made disasters.

The logic is simple: An argument could materialize to pressure the West that “the longer Kiev resists, the higher the risks are for everyone.” But this can lead to a categorically harsh reaction, the real reasons for which I will explain below.

Now Russia has lost the ability to plan its actions. The hierarchy of decision-making has been undermined, the behavioral model of "Let's do this" lacks the necessary level of critical analysis and counteraction. Adventurism has been added where it should not even be in theory.

Now for more important aspects of the planning phase of the war. Our problem, not just at the level of the FSB, but at the level of Russia as whole, turned out to be in the thinking that Ukraine was perceived, just “like Russia itself, under the weight of American narratives.” (Meaning many in Russia thought that America manipulated not only Russia, but also Ukraine.) And the approaches were developed as if “toward Russia.” (So the Kremlin thought they could plan the war against Ukraine as if they planned it against Russia, a country they of course know quite well.)

Now we can state that we are dealing with a country with a completely different mentality (Ukraine), so all the original plans for war for this reason alone can be thrown into the fire. By the way, there is more than one reason.

In Russia, the role of the security wing (siloviki) is immense. In terms of security, the FSB [despite all our minuses] remains as powerful foundation that controls everything.

And the certainty that things were similar with the SBU in Ukraine came at too high a price. (SBU is the Ukrainian Security Service branch.)

According to the original plan, with the overthrow of the pro-Western regime (in Ukraine) and the coming to power of pro-Russian forces, a key marker also appeared: the reaction of the Department of Protection of National Statehood of the SBU to our preparatory actions.

Considering that the SBU is now working under the close control and mentoring of the Americans [of which I have no doubts myself], we also understood that they may have some trump cards.

On the information war front, they have now risen to an unpleasantly high level - this direction, as well their security forces wing (of the SBU, since they have special forces), which has had steady practice for many years now, we consider a hard blow.

But, on the other hand, it was hard to imagine a huge gap in the level of the different departments (in the SBU).

Their Department for the Protection of National Statehood is analogous to our Service for the Protection of the Constitutional System and the Fight against Terrorism [School grade: 2 (Grade: F in US lexicon)], and we expected main opposition to our plans from them.

By all indications, which was 100% confirmed by subsequent events, it appeared that the SBU department was acting so primitively and ineptly that there could be no significant threat to our plans.

Here, I believe, we made a major miscalculation, extrapolating the level of this department to the security system of Ukraine as a whole. And this miscalculation was superimposed on the second: we assumed that in terms of influence on the processes inside the country, the SBU plays the same role as the FSB does in Russia.

And if you also remember the miscalculation of the political leadership with their bet on individual figures [who even then had no authority, and now went into hiding], then the result begins appear immediately.

Add to the pile the situation with the "masses of reliable agents in Ukraine" - that is, in general, the whole picture. (Note the quoted post should say "trained civilian fighters" - missed a word. Sorry)

And the SBU has utilized both its force wing and information warfare specialists to the fullest extent.

In general, we partly knew where the trouble will be, so the Ukrainian information operations units from both the military and the SBU took their hits, including physical ones.

But the effect here was not achieved: the Ukrainians were immeasurably better at this kind of information attack on us than we were on them. On the one hand, they immediately created a backdrop of coverage of the operation in their favor, shaping the attitude of Ukrainians to what was happening as a war for homeland.

In our country there were no countermeasures in this regard in the early days, largely because of the secrecy of the beginning, largely because at first, we thought to concentrate on explaining the need (for the Ukrainians) to stop resisting. On the other hand, the information war is a purely offensive war, where there is no place for defense. (Meaning the SBU information warfare against the invasion managed to permeate Russian society.)

Ukrainian information warfare specialists simply stormed into our territory: demonstrations of prisoners, their calls to their parents - against the backdrop of our attempts to remove real information from the Russian audience, we received a total dominance of "alien" information.

In terms of information warfare, we continue to suffer losses, which in the early days was a complete rout.

Fakes, beautiful motivational legends, innuendos, disinformation, pieces of quite real information from the battlefield [in our country they were not allowed on the air at all] - this is where the American training (of the SBU) seems to have had the greatest results.

And here we can add Zelensky's unexpected behavior, which no one was prepared for.

His image as a drug addict and comedian [we emphasized this] against the backdrop of his media pitch has played a cruel joke with Russians because of the dissonance of image and behavior.

The situation was exacerbated by the fact that we had no symmetrical response: V. Putin, keeping his distance from the closest circle, looked much more lost to any outside observer than Zelensky, and we had no charismatic figures of our own to counterbalance the constant broadcasting of Ukrainian figures.

In recent days, Russia has been building its own model of media behavior, but, first of all, it is too late, and, second, in the media field by definition it’s harder for us to go up against professional showmen. Incomparable.

And the key surprise was that Ukraine was pulled out of centralized management, all military decisions were completely left up to the military [without interference of political objectives]. It was the same with the regional authorities, which made operational management extremely flexible.

Given that the information battle was lost, for Ukrainians this war became a war for homeland, destroying plans for the special operation format with finality.

The Western world was so taken over by the image of this Ukraine that no serious Western politician can speak out with an attempt to pressure Ukraine anymore [it was not so until recently].

And even in their (Western politicians’) attempts at tacit negotiations with Zelensky, they will be afraid to push: a public statement by Zelensky about such a call to surrender would undercut any Western politician's rating.

As a result, years of quite successful work with a political stratum of Western countries loyal to Russia was ruined by an asymmetrical blow. Add to this the banning of broadcasting from a purely Russian point of view - it's over, for now there's no way to respond.

Will the terrorist attacks radically change the situation? No.

But I consider their risk (of occurring) to be enormously high. Even in Russia. Or rather – especially in Russia.

Am I certain that the FSB would not go for a large-scale terrorist attack against their own population?

Not only am I certain, but I am certain that they will prevent all such terrorist attacks professionally and to the maximum extent possible.

(NOTE: #WindofChange wrote this letter #9 on March 17th. On April 8th, he wrote the following letter on this subject:)

Can another of our intelligence agencies take on such a task (false flag terror attack against Russian civilians) with a purely military approach? Yes.

Are there forces in Russia, other than the General Staff, that might consider such a scenario? Yes.

But to name them would be like reading coffee grounds, and naming them would sound like an unwarranted accusation on my part.

A brief assessment of the situation as a whole: not funny anymore.


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Saturday, April 09, 2022

Impending Russian domestic terror false flag attacks on apartment buildings marked with "Z" & "V" - 15th letter from the Wind of Change inside the FSB

URGENT: 15th #FSBletters from the #WindofChange inside the FSB to Vladimir Osechkin. Dated 4/8. Message to the people of Russia and regional FSB offices to anticipate impending domestic terror false flag attacks on Russian civilian infrastructure by the Russian government.

Was hoping it would not come to this, but alas…

I must ask you to warn about the very specific terrorist risks to civilian infrastructure in Russia.

What changed: In Russia in general, although not consistent from region to region, there is a growing trend of vandalism against “V” and “Z” symbols on cars & buildings, instead of the anticipated decline by the authorities.

To give you an idea, the level of deterrence (against Russians vandalizing these symbols that stand for fascism as did the Swastika in Hitler’s Germany) has already reached the maximum capability of all departments, the investigations are conducted as if dealing with very serious crimes and no resources are being spared. Measures far beyond the law have been taken - brutal detention and torture.

There is a desire (or need - this is verbal equivocation by the bosses) to bring the response to such vandalism to the level of "counter-terrorism".

The FSB has been involved to the full extent, even though formally it is not even our jurisdiction. And now it is necessary, so to speak, to "secure the agenda."

Under the direction of one of the offices in the FSB, the work of painting of large “V” and “Z” symbols has begun on residential buildings, preferably free-standing, especially in the regions with high levels of “vandalism of the symbols.”

There is also special emphasis on the border areas of Crimea and Belgorod.

It is these objects that will be supposedly the targets of sabotage strikes [although I am inclined to consider it direct terrorism] to elevate the terrorist threat, accommodate readiness for covert mobilization (mass contracting of conscripts and reservists), etc.

Our colleagues (FSB) on the ground will not be informed, and I can't predict the level of planned damage or casualties.

But such terrorist attacks and hundreds of civilian casualties can provoke certain processes that go beyond any projection of the authors of this approach. (To unify the country & drum up support for an external war)

I ask you to pay attention to all freestanding residential buildings and especially high-rise buildings in Russian regions, primarily in the border areas of the Belgorod region, as well as in Crimea, where large V and Z symbols have recently been painted [and will be in the next few days]: these objects require increased attention from the state security (regional FSB offices).

Guys from the regional FSB! All responsibility will be shifted not only to the mythical "internal enemies," but to you as well! None of us wants acts of demonstrative intimidation, let alone explosions of residential buildings with people inside.

If this scenario is realized, completely insane processes will be triggered affecting everyone.

This warning should be a direct basis for the residents of such buildings to appeal to the regional offices of the Federal Security Service, demanding enhanced control over the security of these structures.


Russian text: Copy/paste from here and send to everyone you know in Russia:


От "Ветра Перемен" изнутри ФСБ


8/4/2022 - СРОЧНО. Важно. Обращение Источника к жителям России и к сотрудникам региональных подразделений ФСБ о подготовке серии терактов. 

Надеялся, что до такого не дойдёт, ан-нет... Вынужден попросить предупредить об уже вполне конкретных террористических рисках для объектов гражданской инфраструктуры в России.

Что изменилось: в России (в целом неравномерно от региона к региону) вместо спада вандализма по отношению к символике V и Z на автомобилях/зданиях идёт нарастающая тенденция. Чтобы Вы понимали, уровень противодействия этому уже достиг максимальных возможностей всех ведомств, расследования ведутся как по особо тяжким делам, сил и средств никто не жалеет, меры воздействия - с выходом за рамки законных (жёсткие задержания, пытки). 

Есть желание (или необходимость - это уже словесная эквилибристика начальства) вывести противодействие такому вандализму до уровня "противодействия терроризму". Службу вовлекли в это в полном объёме, хотя формально это даже не наша подследственность. И сейчас нужно, так сказать, «закрепить повестку».

Под контролем одного из управлений Службы начато нанесение символики V и Z на (по возможности отдельно стоящие) жилые дома в регионах с особо высоким уровнем "символьного вандализма". Отдельно идут приграничные районы в Крыму и Белгороде - там сделают особый упор. Именно по этим объектам могут быть нанесены якобы диверсионные удары (хотя я склонен считать это прямым терроризмом), чтобы повысить уровень террористической угрозы, готовность к скрытой мобилизации (массовому заключению контрактов с срочниками и резервистами) и т.д. 

Наших коллег на местах никто в известность ставить не будет, уровень планируемых повреждений и наличие жертв прогнозировать не берусь. Но подобные действия (теракты и сотни жертв среди мирного населения) смогут спровоцировать такие процессы, которые выйдут за рамки любых прогнозов авторов подобного подхода.

Я прошу обратить внимание ко всем отдельно стоящим жилым объектам и особенно высотным зданиям в регионах России, в первую очередь в приграничных районах Белгородской области, а также в Крыму, на которых на днях уже разместили (разместят в ближайшие дни) разметку V и Z: этим объектам требуется повышенное внимание по линии госбезопасности. 

Ребята из региональных УФСБ! Всю ответственность сгрузят не только на мифических "внутренних врагов", но и на Вас! Никому из нас не нужны ни акты показательного устрашения, ни тем более взрывы жилых зданий с людьми внутри.

Если сейчас этот сценарий реализуют, то запустятся уже совершенно безумные процессы для всех.

Данное предупреждение может быть прямым основанием для обращения жителей таких домов в региональные управления ФСБ с требованием усиленного контроля за безопасностью этих объектов.


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