Thursday, July 14, 2022

Russian trap for Ukrainian military in Kherson to implicate Ukraine in brutal terrorism which will be carried out by Russians disguised as Ukrainian partisans - July 13th Letter from the Wind of Change inside the FSB

Access the Twitter thread here 

Please listen to this first to understand the background & context of the FSB letters:

🚨🧵URGENT: #Russia has laid a trap for Ukrainian military in #Kherson - to implicate #Ukraine in brutal terrorism which will be carried out by Russians disguised as Ukrainian partisans. Happening right now. Execution(s) anticipated between now and July 15 Moscow time.

My translation of the July 13th #FSBletters from the #WindofChange inside the FSB to @Vlad_Osechkin. Please share far & wide. 
As always, my comments for clarification are in (parenthesis). Wind of Change's parenthesis are in [brackets]: Subject: Preparations for liquidations & provocations “I must ask that you immediately publish this information.

Liquidation of relatives of someone from the (Russian-installed puppet government) leadership is being planned (by Russia) in Kherson. I assume [I do not claim] it concerns Stremousov or one of the people in his inner circle.
(Stremousov is a Ukrainian traitor serving as the deputy head of the Kherson Military-Civilian Administration, appointed by Russia.)

Mechanism: our General Staff specialists approached the Ukrainian military disguised as "Ukrainian partisans.” They offered to orchestrate the liquidation of "those (Ukrainians) involved in the collaboration (with Russia)."

The goal is simple: the Ukrainian side must confirm its involvement in the impending liquidation.
Practical objectives: the plan is to murder a family member, a close person, from the entourage of the Kherson [city or region] leadership as brutally and demonstratively as possible.
Selection according to the standard principle - the victim must be empathically significant: a grandmother, a child, a pregnant woman, etc. We need to urgently secure unequivocal evidence of "Ukrainian terrorism.”

If the Ukrainian side, even someone in the Armed Forces at the middle level, agrees to acknowledge the result before finding out the details, he will effectively become an accomplice. No one will care that the acknowledgement was made out of ignorance.
The details of the murder will be uncovered immediately after the Ukrainian side takes responsibility - then Kiev will have no chance to win back the situation (of moral superiority).

Very simply and briefly I describe the plan in stages: 1) The "Kherson partisans" (disguised Russian agents) offer the Ukrainian side the possibility of eliminating someone from the circle of significant collaborators.

2) If the Ukrainian side agrees and is willing to take responsibility, then (the Russian side will commit) an insanely brutal murder of relative(s) empathically significant to a former Ukrainian citizen, in the leadership of the military administration of Kherson.
(This target) despite the fact that there are many members from Russian counterintelligence there (in leadership positions). But the details are not disclosed.

3) The Ukrainian side makes a public statement that "we will punish the collaborators and persons associated with them, as we did today" - something like that.

4) Video of the brutal murder is published on behalf of the "partisans," (Russian General Staff operatives disguised as Ukrainian partisans), the Russian side makes all the necessary statements, a classic information operation of discrediting begins, and the official involvement of Kiev will be beyond doubt.

5) The international community condemns this, sharply reducing the level of support for Kiev. Russia is faced with the need to "respond to an act of international terrorism."

As I wrote earlier, almost everything is ready for a second offensive, taking into account the mistakes of February 24-27.

Let me explain my position: I am not getting involved in the war on the Ukrainian side against Russia right now, but I am categorically opposed to the pigeonholing of everyone and everything in this war, including our service (FSB) and allied forces.

It has now gone unprecedentedly far, but there is still a chance to stop the slide into pure blatant terrorism.

I am certain the target (of the brutal terrorism) is already identified - they need a result by the 15th. The State Duma will be urgently convened for this story. The 6th and 11th departments (of the FSB) are working 24/7, preparing the special event.

Ukrainians must also be aware that any agreement by them to kill relatives of their traitors is unacceptable. If they are already in contact with this group of "partisans" - let them put the brakes on the possibility of taking responsibility and consider all possible risks.

In a nutshell, why Kherson was chosen: despite the fact that the counterintelligence service is working hard and there is some managerial success by the Russian civilian personnel, they are underperforming.

As for the old cadres, primarily #Stremousov, it is impossible to remove him now - we need motivating examples for the others (Ukrainians to switch sides), and examples are not good right now.

And no one can tolerate this level of managerial stupidity for long. An elementary example: they allocated 10,000 rubles (per person) from the Russian budget to help the local population.

The process of organizing the distribution of funds was assigned to the locals [they will not be able to steal it themselves, they just need to solve a simple organizational problem].
As a result, there is a "decree" that in order to register (to receive 10,000 rubles per person), a representative of a group of at least 10 residents from the selected area must collect documents from all others and stand in line to receive the money.

They must get in line during curfew, at night (which is obviously not allowed) - otherwise there is no chance to get through the line, and the entire queue restarts the next day, so their spots are not saved.

Local population's dissatisfaction is growing at a rapid pace, as not a single minor local issue is being solved by the authorities themselves – they can’t solve anything at all.

In addition, the local population is extremely hostile to Russia, even the notionally passive segment of the population. Fighting the partisans is impossible as long as the can rely on the loyalty and support of the population. The partisans have been a nightmare (for Russia).

That is why a quick and radical one-strike solution to all problems was chosen. But no one wants to see that by such "solutions" we perpetuate a terrorist way of thinking in everyone without exception.

Unfortunately, I'm not (unfairly) demonizing the (Russian security) services, it's just that I no longer harbor any illusions. Respectfully, all the best." (END OF TRANSLATION of the July 7th FSB letter from Wind of Change)

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Sunday, July 10, 2022

Kremlin plan to annihilate Belarusian army in Ukraine and seize Belarus itself as a result, turn Lukashenko into hostage-puppet - July 7th - Letter from the Wind of Change inside the FSB

 Access the Twitter thread here 

🚨🧵My translation of the July 7th #FSBletters from the #WindofChange inside the FSB to Vladimir Osechkin. Subject: Kremlin plan to annihilate Belarusian army in Ukraine and seize #Belarus itself as a result, turn #Lukashenko into hostage-puppet. Please share far & wide.

Please listen to this audio series for background & context on Wind of Change, the FSB letters, Vladimir Osechkin, and myself:

As always, my comments for clarification are in (parenthesis). Wind of Change's parenthesis are in [brackets]. So, let's roll:
“Let’s continue – the Republic of Belarus (RB).
Here is an excerpt from the working paper of the Service (FSB) on Belarus. I assume the final version will be technically different [rather, it will be worked out and finalized], but the main conclusions can be understood: (START Excerpt from the actual draft:)
‘At the moment, the task of raising the morale of the Belarusian Armed Forces cannot be considered successfully accomplished for a number of reasons that are objectively beyond the control of the Russian Federal Security Service. Among the key reasons are the following:
Historically, the Belarusian Armed Forces have not explored the idea of combat operations outside of Belarus.
This factor in itself is not critical, but its superimposition with the mentality of the Belarus military of an increased tendency to territorial sedentarism (anti-imperialism) and lack of flexibility in understanding the brotherhood of the Slavic peoples affects it.

This confluence of factors in Belarus has historically been perceived as natural at all levels of the military hierarchy, so there was no counteraction;

The increased tendency to territorial sedentarization forms a specific way of thinking in the majority of personnel of the Belarus military, in which, in the absence of nominal resistance to new attitudes and requirements, there is persistent adherence to old attitudes.
In such a format of "silent rebellion" and under conditions of limited time it is practically impossible either to reverse the established attitudes or to identify and localize the sources of the greatest resistance in the team;

A mentality has been formed among the main mass of the personnel of the Belarus Armed Forces, based on the prejudices, that it is impossible to conduct combat operations against the AFU directly on the territory of Ukraine.
Given the relatively small grouping of the Belarusian Armed Forces with the potential to be used in active offensive combat operations in Ukraine, this moral and psychological state of the personnel practically nullifies both the factor of direct combat training and the potential for additional recruitment of the contingent directly from the Belarusian Armed Forces;

The lack of active involvement of the Belarusian Armed Forces in Ukraine has a negative impact both directly on the course of the special military operation, and on the mood of the Belarusian Armed Forces. Among the second category, the following are particularly noteworthy:

Decrease in the level of unconditional authority of the Russian Armed Forces in the eyes of both the command and rank-and-file personnel of the Belarusian Armed Forces;

"Khutorian mindset" is a factor for mental similarity between the Belarusian and Ukrainian Armed Forces, which contributes to the association of the Belarusian Armed Forces with the AFU (Ukraine forces) to a much greater extent than with the Russian Armed Forces.
It is worth emphasizing that the actions of the Belarusian authorities not only do not prevent such an association, but also contribute to it to a greater or lesser extent.
If the situation remains as it is now with the non-involvement of the Belarusian Armed Forces in the special military operation, this trend will intensify, risking the formation of a stable center of resistance to our actions inside the Belarusian Armed Forces;

In case of a precedent of large-scale clashes between the Armed Forces of Belarus and the AFU (Ukraine), the severity of military losses of the former will be perceived exclusively as an unequivocal conflict with a tendency to increase mutual hatred.
In addition, significant losses of Belarus military personnel at the hands of the Ukrainian military & territorial defense will be a key factor in accepting the correctness of the Russian position regarding the motives and objectives of the special military operation in Ukraine.

In light of the above, qualitative adjustments should be made to the program for the involvement of the Belarusian Armed Forces in the special military operation, as follows:

Do not consider the combat cohesion objectives of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus as paramount and self-sufficient;

Refuse to plan a long-term military strategy for possible offensive actions of the Belarusian Armed Forces;

Form efforts to deploy as many combat-ready units and formations of the Belarusian Armed Forces as possible simultaneously to break through the enemy defense from the #Volyn and #Rivne Regions of Ukraine;

Shift the focus from the task of maximizing the effectiveness of combat use of the Belarusian Armed Forces from being a futile one to the task of using them as intensively as possible;

This approach implies the inevitability of a significant military defeat, up to and including the catastrophic loss of Armed Forces of Belarus in Ukraine, but ensures that a number of both critical and tactical, as well as strategic objectives are achieved:

The AFU (#Ukraine) command will be forced to redeploy significant forces in the direction of the RB (Belarus) on an almost permanent basis, which in the current situation with the special military operation can be assessed as a clear success of the RF (Russian) Armed Forces;

Belarusian society as a whole will face a radical change in the views on the special military operation, shifting to the appreciation of the Russian and not the Ukrainian side;

Any level of destruction of the Belarusian Armed Forces will provide a significant contrast with the actions of the Russian Armed Forces, which continue their methodical offensive and therefore have every right to claim the status of the unconditional leader.
The contrast between the defeat of the Belarusian Armed Forces and the offensive actions of the Russian Armed Forces against the same enemy will be clearly noticeable in the international arena;

The entire military & political responsibility for the defeat of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus will fall exclusively on the Belarusian leadership, which against this backdrop will lose its stature both in domestic and foreign policy.

With this development (catastrophic defeat of Belarus in Ukraine), the current level of integration processes in both countries (Belarus & #Russia) allows us to confidently assert that control over both military and civilian structures in Belarus will be transferred to Russian structures until the formation of a unified command system.

The higher the level of losses in the Belarusian Armed Forces during offensives in the #Volyn and #Rivne directions, the faster and more effective will be the replacement of senior personnel with Russian specialists.'

(END excerpt of the FSB working paper on #Belarus, translation of FSB letter continues ⬇️)

(SECTION REDACTED) Very briefly on the essence of what was stated, from the point of view of the Service (FSB), but, as far as I know, there is no particular disagreement with the General Staff here:

- The troops of the Republic of Belarus are not ready to fight on the territory of Ukraine, they are no longer considered to be a significant strategic reserve for an offensive operation;

- "Untouched" troops of Belarus are assessed as a negative factor for Russian security rather than a positive one; (Meaning the Kremlin considers Belarus military a threat)

- At the same time, the painful defeat of the troops of Belarus in Ukraine is assessed as an absolute success for Russia: it will emphasize the strength of the Russian Armed Forces and introduce the effect of "blood enemies" between the Belarusian and Ukrainian militaries;

- The Ukrainian Armed Forces will be forced to divert reserves to the Belarusian direction, which, given the shortage of military resources of all parties in the conflict, can be regarded as a definite success;

- Political responsibility for the defeat of the Armed Forces of of Belarus will fall on the leadership of Belarus, after which Russian institutions will begin to seize power there.

I will not claim that this vague wording implies a forceful seizure of power from #Lukashenko - it is unlikely [although, after Feb 24th I presume nothing].

Rather, Lukashenko will become an "honorary hostage-prisoner", who will even be allowed to read various touching proclamations from a piece of paper.

Both Belarus and Kazakhstan are no longer regarded as genuinely friendly countries (to Russia), (difference compared to Belarus is) just that there are no Russian troops in Kazakhstan.

Lukashenko, on the other hand, does not have much of a choice, although his skill at maneuvering and eluding should be commended.

Again, the plan I relayed is not an "accurate forecast," but the desire and vision of the Service (FSB) leadership and Patron. That this scenario will be attempted is certain, but to attempt and to implement are verbs with different semantic connotations.

And again this is not farewell - I am preparing several more letters, including about the leading role of the FSB in the organization of the system of power in prospective territories [future annexation], we have already sent more than a hundred officers on long assignments.

As additional confirmation I am attaching [not for publication before Oct 1st 2022, these photos have only been seen by narrow circle of people] photos of our colonels and generals in the offices of the DPR ("Donetsk People's Republic") leadership and key functionaries of the provisional administrations".

It is difficult to process the sheer insidiousness and intent of the designers of this war, but the goals are obvious...." (END OF TRANSLATION of the #FSBletters from #WindofChange dated July 7th, 2022)