Start Here

All #FSBletters translated as of April 29th, 2022 - Chronological Order - Look Inside

Before reading these #FSBletters from the #WindofChange, please watch/listen to the following audio for the origin & context of these le...

Monday, April 11, 2022

Consequences of large-scale mobilization, what Russia plans to do next, Bucha genocide, Kadyrov, terror attacks - 14th letter from the Wind of Change inside the FSB

My translation of the 14th #FSBletters from the #WindofChange inside the FSB to Vladimir Osechkin. Dated 4/4. Topics: Consequences of large-scale mobilization, what Russia plans to do next, Bucha genocide, Kadyrov, terror attacks. Please share far & wide. 

Please listen to this audio as it explains the context and the genesis of the #FSBletters. It will help you understand the prism through which these letters are to be read. You will understand in real human terms why #WindofChange writes to Vladimir.

 

As always, my comments for clarification are in (parenthesis). #WindofChange's parenthesis are in [brackets]. So, let's roll:

 

For all the dynamism of the situation and new events, trend is the same - total violence in all directions.

 

But I would like to focus on the subject of mobilization specifically - it is now becoming almost a cornerstone from the point of view of the top leadership.

 

On the one side, it’s silly to discuss any prospects of war: Military failure is already evident, and the "brave offensive from Kiev towards Donetsk via Belarus" is perceived by all as an unambiguous escape. (Referring to retreat from Kyiv to Belarus by the Russian battalions)

 

The ОДКБ (CSTO – Russian version of NATO partners including Belarus) will not give troops - even direct terrorist attacks on their territory with successful attribution to the Ukrainians, and this task cannot be carried out by morons from the GRU (Russian Military Intelligence), is far from being a solution to the problem. Although work is being done in this direction...

 

Now to the problems that prevent the start of large-scale mobilization in Russia.

1. Mobilization in the form of agitation to sign the contract is going on, but the result is absolutely useless.

2. The status of special operation will have to be scrapped - the legal justification for a "special operation" involving mobilized people is nonsense. Even lunacy must have limits. Hence the next point.

3. A transition to total martial law would kill the economy. It will be like imposing sanctions from within against yourself. Mobilization will have to take place for a long time: you cannot just take a man, dress him, and send him away. Even if he served once. Just the training will take 2-3 months, and that is very minimal. There’s a type of mobilization when trained military personnel, including those in support roles, are sent to the front, and they are replaced, especially those on extra duty in the units, by the mobilized, but there are already conscripts who have replaced contract soldiers under this scheme.

4. "What if it doesn't work?" This question was left unanswered when they planned to take Kiev in 3 days. Now we can finally approach the situation from a critical point of view. And what if the population responds by resisting mobilization? The choice here is simple: draconian measures to intimidate anyone and everyone who dares to squirm, otherwise almost everyone will run. But if there is still resistance to mobilization? Draconian measures, if they are absolutely widespread, will turn potential fighters into a real army, aimed instead against the authorities. And to counteract that would require diversion of serious forces against the refusers. Who are, again, in significantly short supply. We’ve already played around with fake statistics, and we are stuffed. Now the task is to get real statistics on the expected number of refusals for different types of mobilization.

 

5. Technical capabilities: Mobilization is a very complex process, especially on the anticipated scale. There is already skepticism about the military's "expectation reports," now there is an attempt to assess the country's technical readiness for such a large-scale mobilization as covertly, promptly and adequately as possible.

 

This is a monumental managerial burden on all services, where a failure in one area would lead to a failure of the entire system. It is necessary to balance the available people for the required staff vacancies, and the staffing needs should be calculated as accurately as possible. In general, it is not clear yet how ready we are. And it's very possible that we won't be able to find out before the process begins.

 

6. The transition to an unequivocally protracted war requires a complete change in the economic and political approach inside the country. Here, even the usual reforms didn't work out, but to transition the entire Russian economy into fundamentally new conditions in a few days or weeks - it is an impossible management task. I don’t know it’s an appropriate project, but even if it were, it is impossible to implement all the plans in a short period of time without critical errors. I don’t even know what to compare it to - a construction of a new economic system for a nation. We can't figure this one out yet.

 

7. Negotiating with our hands tied: If you start mobilizing, then negotiations become moot for months to come. This can make the situation much worse, although how it’ll be “worse" and what else might happen is an interesting question. Only a fool would think that "it will not get worse.” Even if we do not see an option for worse, it’s definitely there. And to negotiate under conditions of mobilization - everyone understands that it’s a bluff.

 

8. Divergence of goals and capabilities: If we go into full mobilization and a protracted war, then a military victory over Ukraine [hypothetical] will accomplish nothing. In the current world we will be simply wiped out, there will be no chance to escape peacefully. So, if we do take this step (large-scale mobilization), then in order to enter negotiations to achieve the desired result, it will be necessary to create pressure on Europe at minimum. With a corresponding capture of eastern part of Europe and a direct threat to capture the rest. But these are – objectives. But the opportunities may shrink to the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Here is the difficulty: capturing Sloviansk or Kramatorsk is not the same as threatening to go to Berlin or Paris.

 

9. It was not for nothing that I once compared the current campaign to the war against Japan a century ago. Back then, too, we played around with getting a "small triumph.” Analogies repeat themselves, and trying to cover the problem with human resources provides no guarantee of the desired result.

 

But risks reveal themselves. In modern warfare, quantitative indicators are completely inferior to qualitative ones. A large contingent is needed primarily for logistics and control of occupied territories. If we focus the strike in the direction of Donbass, then the "war with flesh" will also have no effect here: over all these years, Ukraine has created solid lines of fortifications there, and it is easier to organize supplies for them there than for our side. And our large forces in the attack can turn into great losses and risk, as the classics would say, "transformation of an imperialist war into a civil war.” I exaggerate, of course, but only in part: the risk of internal rebellion from significant failures skyrockets.

 

10. It’s not quite clear what exactly is required for a guaranteed victory from our [Russian] side.

On February 24, we used all our prepared tricks: the surprise factor, clearing the approaches to Kherson, the head of the Kherson SBU was recruited in advance and carried out this mission, utilized the Belarusian direction, the entire mass of missile attacks, the morale of the army [was a head higher than now], using the direction through Chernobyl [no one expected us there, and it’s even clear why we weren’t expected there].

 

What exactly do we need to do today to turn the tide? What can we use now that we haven't used before? Sheer numbers in ground forces that lack proper training – doesn’t appear to be something reliable. This is a topic for the military, but so far there has been little clarity.

 

In general, mobilization under such conditions is far from being the solution. For Ukraine, the withdrawal of our troops exposed the pathway to Belarus - if the Ukrainians had invaded there, it would have been a chance to turn to the CSTO again. But it wasn’t something we could hope for. (Meaning Russian command knew Ukrainian forces wouldn’t go into Belarus to chase the retreating Russian forces.)

 

Militarily, to the point of new understanding, we need to wait for two results: whether the attempt to encircle the Donbass position of the AFU (Armed Forces of Ukraine) will be successful for the Russian army, and whether it will be possible to make a breakthrough to Transnistria via Odessa.

This second option is military madness, but Moldova, judging by their statements, is frightened and fully believes this.

 

Now for the current problems: Bucha is a problem that was not anticipated, but nor is it a surprise. No command would ever order such a blatant extermination of civilians, but in the face of low control and the circumstances... partly predictable. The situation could escalate to such a level that the consequences are very, very hard to overestimate. (The West’s response to the genocide in Bucha.)

 

There are no good solutions here - what is left is the need to jump out of the situation. The key technical point is to try at all costs to seize the initiative in the information confrontation.

 

Be the first to demand an investigation, demand an international commission, they provide their findings - the pattern of behavior of the bureaucratic machine never changes, in fact we have "Boeing #2" in terms of effect and influence. (Reference to MH17 Boeing-777 shot down by Russia in 2014 over Ukraine, murdering 298 civilians from 10 countries)

It’s impossible to rule out our own punishment for those responsible for what happened, and it’s impossible to allow such actions to become public. The point of shifting attention and blame - Ukrainian officials and politicians from cities occupied by Russian forces publicly and directly collaborated. (This will be the false narrative sold to the Russian public & Ukrainian population in occupied territories to explain Bucha genocide.)

 

If they and/or their families (Ukrainian officials/politicians in cities currently occupied by Russian forces) are exterminated in an extremely demonstrative and brutal manner, the responsibility in any case will fall on the Ukrainian side. (So goes the current Kremlin thinking on how to sell the Bucha genocide to the Russian population & Ukrainian population in occupied territories.)

 

From an informational standpoint, we'll get a chance to shift attention - theoretically.

Politically, we risk losing the loyalty of the population (inside Ukraine in occupied cities), which is already afraid to openly support Russia, and there are very few of them there now.

 

But our people began to literally play their moves in advance, patching up the existing gaps and not thinking about what will come out of it later. So, I allow this as a possibility.

 

Kadyrov: (Inside Chechnya) He understands what will happen to him if he presses the "stop" button on the war. And it appears he has decided to go for broke. We'll soon see. In any case, there is no more unanimity in the country (Chechnya) - the war party and the peace party are already approaching the point of direct conflict, and the arbitrator is nowhere to be seen. The spillover of foreign war into domestic war under such conditions is very real.

 

Everything can go belly-up at any moment (in Russia). The threat of terrorist attacks is at maximum (both false flag & orchestrated by Russian civilian fanatics who support the war). Everywhere. Control over the situation is at a critically low level, or has been lost altogether. Almost everywhere. No one knows what will happen next.

=====================

BTC: bc1q6qj2uzuu96pf5j4lmhkh42e85f7tdqja036ltp

ETH: 0xd5Be5f62017297e946c1717602Af26A06Ed16d62

ADA: addr1q87q8kzcslql3gr9mmmxxyrcqjqvc6zq24d8paw098sjkfluq0v93p7plzsxthhkvvg8spyqe35yq426wr6u720p9vnsx4x68l DOGECOIN: DEJ1ph2jtaXKHwnP251DsLp2Aoshr29ASf