My translation of the 14th #FSBletters from the #WindofChange inside the FSB to Vladimir Osechkin. Dated 4/4. Topics: Consequences of large-scale mobilization, what Russia plans to do next, Bucha genocide, Kadyrov, terror attacks. Please share far & wide.
Please listen to this audio as it explains the
context and the genesis of the #FSBletters. It will help you understand the
prism through which these letters are to be read. You will understand in real
human terms why #WindofChange writes to Vladimir.
As always, my comments for clarification are in
(parenthesis). #WindofChange's parenthesis are in [brackets]. So, let's roll:
For all the dynamism of the situation and new
events, trend is the same - total violence in all directions.
But I would like to focus on the subject of
mobilization specifically - it is now becoming almost a cornerstone from the
point of view of the top leadership.
On the one side, it’s silly to discuss any prospects
of war: Military failure is already evident, and the "brave offensive from
Kiev towards Donetsk via Belarus" is perceived by all as an unambiguous escape.
(Referring to retreat from Kyiv to Belarus by the Russian battalions)
The ОДКБ (CSTO – Russian version of NATO partners
including Belarus) will not give troops - even direct terrorist attacks on
their territory with successful attribution to the Ukrainians, and this task
cannot be carried out by morons from the GRU (Russian Military Intelligence),
is far from being a solution to the problem. Although work is being done in
this direction...
Now to the problems that prevent the start of
large-scale mobilization in Russia.
1. Mobilization in the form of agitation to sign
the contract is going on, but the result is absolutely useless.
2. The status of special operation will have to
be scrapped - the legal justification for a "special operation"
involving mobilized people is nonsense. Even lunacy must have limits. Hence the
next point.
3. A transition to total martial law would kill
the economy. It will be like imposing sanctions from within against yourself.
Mobilization will have to take place for a long time: you cannot just take a
man, dress him, and send him away. Even if he served once. Just the training
will take 2-3 months, and that is very minimal. There’s a type of mobilization
when trained military personnel, including those in support roles, are sent to
the front, and they are replaced, especially those on extra duty in the units,
by the mobilized, but there are already conscripts who have replaced contract soldiers
under this scheme.
4. "What if it doesn't work?" This
question was left unanswered when they planned to take Kiev in 3 days. Now we
can finally approach the situation from a critical point of view. And what if
the population responds by resisting mobilization? The choice here is simple:
draconian measures to intimidate anyone and everyone who dares to squirm,
otherwise almost everyone will run. But if there is still resistance to mobilization? Draconian measures,
if they are absolutely widespread, will turn potential fighters into a real
army, aimed instead against the authorities. And to counteract that would
require diversion of serious forces against the refusers. Who are, again, in significantly
short supply. We’ve already played around with fake statistics, and we are stuffed.
Now the task is to get real statistics on the expected number of refusals for
different types of mobilization.
5. Technical capabilities: Mobilization is a
very complex process, especially on the anticipated scale. There is already
skepticism about the military's "expectation reports," now there is
an attempt to assess the country's technical readiness for such a large-scale
mobilization as covertly, promptly and adequately as possible.
This is a monumental managerial burden on all
services, where a failure in one area would lead to a failure of the entire
system. It is necessary to balance the available people for the required staff
vacancies, and the staffing needs should be calculated as accurately as
possible. In general, it is not clear yet how ready we are. And it's very
possible that we won't be able to find out before the process begins.
6. The transition to an unequivocally protracted
war requires a complete change in the economic and political approach inside
the country. Here, even the usual reforms didn't work out, but to transition the
entire Russian economy into fundamentally new conditions in a few days or weeks
- it is an impossible management
task. I don’t know it’s an appropriate project, but even if it were, it is
impossible to implement all the plans in a short period of time without
critical errors. I don’t even know what to compare it to - a construction of a
new economic system for a nation. We can't figure this one out yet.
7. Negotiating with our hands tied: If you start
mobilizing, then negotiations become moot for months to come. This can make the
situation much worse, although how it’ll be “worse" and what else might
happen is an interesting question. Only a fool would think that "it will
not get worse.” Even if we do not see an option for worse, it’s definitely
there. And to negotiate under conditions of mobilization - everyone understands
that it’s a bluff.
8. Divergence of goals and capabilities: If we
go into full mobilization and a protracted war, then a military victory over
Ukraine [hypothetical] will accomplish nothing. In the current world we will be
simply wiped out, there will be no chance to escape peacefully. So, if we do
take this step (large-scale mobilization), then in order to enter negotiations to
achieve the desired result, it will be necessary to create pressure on Europe
at minimum. With a corresponding capture of eastern part of Europe and a direct
threat to capture the rest. But these are – objectives. But the opportunities
may shrink to the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Here is the difficulty:
capturing Sloviansk or Kramatorsk is not the same as threatening to go to
Berlin or Paris.
9. It was not for nothing that I once compared
the current campaign to the war against Japan a century ago. Back then, too, we
played around with getting a "small triumph.” Analogies repeat themselves,
and trying to cover the problem with human resources provides no guarantee of
the desired result.
(THIS UPCOMING 2nd HALF IS ARGUABLY MORE INTERESTING AND ENDS WITH A PLEASANT SURPRISE)
— Igor Sushko (@igorsushko) March 6, 2022
"100% we’ve repeated our mistake from last century, when we decided to kick the “weak” Japan in order to achieve a quick victory, and it turned our army was in a state of total calamity.
But risks reveal themselves. In modern warfare, quantitative indicators are
completely inferior to qualitative ones. A large contingent is needed primarily
for logistics and control of occupied territories. If we focus the strike in
the direction of Donbass, then the "war with flesh" will also have no
effect here: over all these years, Ukraine has created solid lines of
fortifications there, and it is easier to organize supplies for them there than
for our side. And our large forces in the attack can turn into great losses and
risk, as the classics would say, "transformation of an imperialist war into
a civil war.” I exaggerate, of course, but only in part: the risk of internal
rebellion from significant failures skyrockets.
10. It’s not quite clear what exactly is
required for a guaranteed victory from our [Russian] side.
On February 24, we used all our prepared tricks:
the surprise factor, clearing the approaches to Kherson, the head of the
Kherson SBU was recruited in advance and carried out this mission, utilized the
Belarusian direction, the entire mass of missile attacks, the morale of the
army [was a head higher than now], using the direction through Chernobyl [no
one expected us there, and it’s even clear why we weren’t expected there].
What exactly do we need to do today to turn the
tide? What can we use now that we haven't used before? Sheer numbers in ground
forces that lack proper training – doesn’t appear to be something reliable.
This is a topic for the military, but so far there has been little clarity.
In general, mobilization under such conditions
is far from being the solution. For Ukraine, the withdrawal of our troops exposed
the pathway to Belarus - if the Ukrainians had invaded there, it would have
been a chance to turn to the CSTO again. But it wasn’t something we could hope
for. (Meaning Russian command knew Ukrainian forces wouldn’t go into Belarus to
chase the retreating Russian forces.)
Militarily, to the point of new understanding,
we need to wait for two results: whether the attempt to encircle the Donbass position
of the AFU (Armed Forces of Ukraine) will be successful for the Russian army,
and whether it will be possible to make a breakthrough to Transnistria via
Odessa.
This second option is military madness, but
Moldova, judging by their statements, is frightened and fully believes this.
Now for the current problems: Bucha is a problem
that was not anticipated, but nor is it a surprise. No command would ever order
such a blatant extermination of civilians, but in the face of low control and
the circumstances... partly predictable. The situation could escalate to such a
level that the consequences are very, very hard to overestimate. (The West’s
response to the genocide in Bucha.)
There are no good solutions here - what is left
is the need to jump out of the situation. The key technical point is to try at
all costs to seize the initiative in the information confrontation.
Be the first to demand an investigation, demand
an international commission, they provide their findings - the pattern of
behavior of the bureaucratic machine never changes, in fact we have
"Boeing #2" in terms of effect and influence. (Reference to MH17
Boeing-777 shot down by Russia in 2014 over Ukraine, murdering 298 civilians from
10 countries)
It’s impossible to rule out our own punishment
for those responsible for what happened, and it’s impossible to allow such
actions to become public. The point of shifting attention and blame - Ukrainian
officials and politicians from cities occupied by Russian forces publicly and
directly collaborated. (This will be the false narrative sold to the Russian
public & Ukrainian population in occupied territories to explain Bucha genocide.)
If they and/or their families (Ukrainian
officials/politicians in cities currently occupied by Russian forces) are
exterminated in an extremely demonstrative and brutal manner, the
responsibility in any case will fall on the Ukrainian side. (So goes the
current Kremlin thinking on how to sell the Bucha genocide to the Russian
population & Ukrainian population in occupied territories.)
From an informational standpoint, we'll get a
chance to shift attention - theoretically.
Politically, we risk losing the loyalty of the
population (inside Ukraine in occupied cities), which is already afraid to
openly support Russia, and there are very few of them there now.
But our people began to literally play their moves
in advance, patching up the existing gaps and not thinking about what will come
out of it later. So, I allow this as a possibility.
Kadyrov: (Inside Chechnya) He understands what
will happen to him if he presses the "stop" button on the war. And it
appears he has decided to go for broke. We'll soon see. In any case, there is
no more unanimity in the country (Chechnya) - the war party and the peace party
are already approaching the point of direct conflict, and the arbitrator is nowhere
to be seen. The spillover of foreign war into domestic war under such
conditions is very real.
Everything can go belly-up at any moment (in
Russia). The threat of terrorist attacks is at maximum (both false flag & orchestrated
by Russian civilian fanatics who support the war). Everywhere. Control over the
situation is at a critically low level, or has been lost altogether. Almost everywhere. No one
knows what will happen next.
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