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All #FSBletters translated as of April 29th, 2022 - Chronological Order - Look Inside

Before reading these #FSBletters from the #WindofChange, please watch/listen to the following audio for the origin & context of these le...

Sunday, May 01, 2022

All #FSBletters translated as of April 29th, 2022 - Chronological Order - Look Inside

Before reading these #FSBletters from the #WindofChange, please watch/listen to the following audio for the origin & context of these letters. This will allow you to view & interpret these letters through the right prism. Please feel free to share this page with anyone. (Please subscribe to the YouTube channel - if there is enough interest then I will start posting video content concerning the #FSBletters)

Military planes masquerading as "humanitarian" & Transnistria false-flag terror attacks against civilians for May celebrations in Moldova by Putin - 19th letter from the Wind of Change inside the FSB

My translation of the 19th #FSBletters from the #WindofChange inside the FSB to Vladimir Osechkin. Dated: April 29. Topic: More on the #Transnistria false-flag terror attacks against civilians for May celebrations & upcoming military planes masquerading as "humanitarian."

This is an immediate follow-up to the 18th #FSBletters, so please read that first:

As always, my comments for clarification are in (parenthesis). #WindofChange's parenthesis are in [brackets]. So, let's roll:

"I ask you to publish my information yesterday about Transnistria - I have to say that so far there are more and more confirmations of terrorist acts being prepared there.

The planning and execution are being carried out by the GRU dumbasses, and this will almost certainly mean a hatchet job with lots of casualties. (GRU is Russian Foreign Military Intelligence)

The leadership (in Russia) must understand that the plan for terrorist attacks in the Transnistria CANNOT give them the intended result.

The operational purpose of the (Russian false-flag) attacks, besides everything else - to send "humanitarian rescue operation" planes to Transnistria, which should block the risks of such planes getting shot down by Romanian or Ukrainian air defense [in case they get shot down, it could provide a possibility to enter a new stage of weapons use, that is, untie the hands of unconventional methods]. (Note: #WindofChange *does not* mean nuclear weapons.)

Thus, the bloody terrorist acts against civilians should unblock the air corridor to Transnistria and allow for offensive actions from there. (The “humanitarian” planes Russia intends to send will be military equipment & soldiers to be used in war.)

As a result, we have all the risks of getting into a hot conflict with NATO, expand the geography of the conflict and spice it up with a senseless, large-scale terrorist attack against civilians.

P.S. If someone had just decided to write off the warehouses waiting for an audit by setting them on fire, quite probably, this would not have been vocalized.”

Moldova: Transnistria false-flag terror attacks against civilians for May celebrations & coverup of embezzled military funds - 18th letter from the Wind of Change inside the FSB

Unfortunately, the topic of terrorist attacks (Putin’s false flags) on civilian objects has not gone anywhere, just changed geography. I will tell you later what and how is moving here (FSB) with regards to this subject.


Terrorist attacks with large-scale casualties are planned for the May holidays in Transnistria. (May 9th is the Russian “Victory Day” in WW2, typically celebrations begin May 1st. Transnistria is Russia-occupied region in Moldova which borders Ukraine from south-west.)

"Reaction to the blatant act of aggression" is already being actively prepared in all directions.

In addition, a strike on military facilities in the PMR (Transnistria) is possible - enormous sums had been allocated for the military contingent of the Russian army there, so if "Ukrainian saboteurs on their way from Belgorod also destroy the auditable facilities" in the PMR, then many important people will sleep much better. (Insinuation that large budget allocated for military supplies in Transnistria was embezzled by those in charge, so destruction of where these stocks were supposed to be would eliminate evidence of corruption.)


Furthermore, Transnistria directly demonstrates its reluctance to transition to the rails of military confrontation – they’re already being physically dragged into the “geopolitical agenda of the day” by force. Belarus managed to wriggle out of direct military involvement in Ukraine, but Transnistria has no chance to avoid the inevitable. And the terrorist attacks need to become the focal point for the transition of the war into a new format.

That, so far, the plan of direct bombings of civilian homes inside Russia has been denied is a huge plus [the exposure helped with this (#WindofChange is referring to the 15th #FSBletters Vladmir & I published in Russian & English)]. But shifting the terror over to Transnistrian civilians is not an acceptable solution either.”

19th FSB letter is a continuation on the subject o Transnistria false-flag terror attacks

Ramzan Kadyrov, Russian Nukes, Impending total collapse and/or civil war, and much more Kadyrov! - 16th letter from the Wind of Change inside the FSB

My translation of the 16th #FSBletters from the #WindofChange inside the FSB to Vladimir Osechkin. Dated 4/12. Topics: #Ramzan #Kadyrov, #Russia #Nukes, total collapse or civil war, and much more Kadyrov! Please share far & wide. 

Please listen to this audio as it explains the context and the genesis of the #FSBletters. It will help you understand the prism through which these letters are to be read. You will understand in real human terms why #WindofChange writes to Vladimir.

As always, my comments for clarification are in (parenthesis). #WindofChange's parenthesis are in [brackets]. So, let's roll:

“Kadyrov has been demanding special attention of late, so let me go over this character. For transprency: I have preconceptions about this figure, but I will try to give an analysis without making personal judgments.


Kadyrov has long ago [as part of the "war-operation"] reduced the activity of his militarized formations to purely media work. Yes, his special forces are involved in some attacks, but I will give a few clarifications that can be considered maximally credible:


- The core of his strike groups at the moment is not made up of his elite special forces, but of some "Chechen volunteers," members of the law enforcement agencies, and so on. The percentage of his elite fighters there has decreased dramatically;


- Virtually all combat operations by Chechen units are conducted from behind the lines of the Russian Armed Forces, and even the forces in LDPR. This is called the "dog-and-pony-show";


- The Russian military command, judging by the data provided by the guys from ДВКР (DCKR - Military Counterintelligence), does not have a very good idea of where the so-called "elite forces of Chechen units" are now.


In Chechnya itself there are very active military moves being made, maximally hidden from the public eye. There is reason to believe that Ramzan Kadyrov fears for his own safety due to risks of both internal revolts and external threats [everyone from Ingushetia (bordering Chechnya) to the various agencies, including our Service is getting in line (to neutralize Kadyrov)]. But everything may not turn out to be so simple.


There is reason to believe that Kadyrov not only understands the inevitable civil war in Russia, but is actively playing the sides of the potential rift [Hawks-Doves]: He is simultaneously agitating this rift to a hot phase while also trying accumulate sufficient large-mass support of the radical forces ready to be activated in case the schism fully materializes.


Once again about the civil war: The current reality leaves the country with two options.

First - a total collapse due to a complete combination all the wrong actions put together.

Second - a civil war and a chance to leap into some kind of engineered solution.

To acknowledge this reality – a factual admission of the defeat for the Service. Which is why I don't want to elaborate on this topic for now - it hurts.

Kadyrov himself couldn't care less about Ukraine, about Donbass, or about this whole war-operation.

He has transcended this framework; he is already thinking in a different reality where war/operation is just an element for his plans.

While he was considered just a fool with great power resources, he turned out to be much more cunning [I won't yet say anything about "wiser-smarter"].


Right now, Ramzan is building his game at breakneck speed, a game in which he is not just intending on shutting himself out in defense [like we ourselves assessed until recently], but he is determined to go on the attack.

In essence, he will be the main beneficiary of Russia's military failure: in the coming Donbass meat grinder, he is guaranteed to keep his forces intact, while in any outcome of the battle, the rest of the Russian forces will be severely depleted and exhausted.

His loud declarations about "marching on Kiev" are a wind-up of the supporters of war in Russian society, who can absolutely no longer satiate their appetites through any theoretically possible outcome.

Even if our armed forces win the Donbass battle, the forces will be so weakened that the only thing left to do is take a long pause, consolidate positions, and start urgent replenishment of forces, while it is already unrealistic to restore technical capabilities under such large-scale sanctions in a short period of time.

And even for that you still have to win, which is impossible without large-scale use of non-conventional means of destruction.

The experience of modern warfare of this kind [Syria, Iraq] shows that in the best case, Russian losses will be 1:8, if not 1:10.


 "A tactical nuclear strike" with this kind of intended battle line system would accomplish nothing, a massive strike could provoke such consequences that there is no point in considering them. That is, if it’s “technically possible,” for which there is no certainty.


More precisely, to begin with, this would require the consent of all those involved (to execute a nuclear strike), which appears to be complicated.

Then it will require that the technical capabilities match the "wants," and everything is tricky here. And then you still have to launch in a way that you don't get an equally entertaining missile hitting the point of origin. (A responding nuclear strike from the West)


And the missiles will still need to reach the targets, because "non-uniform intercepts" of such missiles over our territory could be an unpleasant "side effect" that would override everything.


In any event, Kadyrov can't help but realize that after the battle of Donbass he will have the most powerful and combat-ready military force in the country.


But then a great turmoil could ensue, in which everything would be unclear.

The Bolsheviks weren’t any serious force in Russia at the beginning of the last century, but they took proper advantage of the situation, along with the presence of certain valuable cadres, and did not make a mistake over time.


Turmoil gives a chance to those who before it had no chance and who will turn out to be situationally ready for it.


Moreover, Kadyrov is not actually a supporter of the "Russian patriotic ideology" [all his fairy tales of being "Putin's infantryman" are tales for idiots]: If he manages to swallow the whole of Russia - ideal, if he manages to swallow a significant part of it - also good, if he manages to create a conditional "Caucasus Emirates" - and who says that this isn’t enough for Kadyrov and those who are now very quietly and methodically preparing the turf for this project?


All real analysis ends at the point at which the turmoil [civil war, total upheaval - wordsmithing is allowed here] begins. By all indications, Kadyrov is preparing for this moment like no other, everything else is noise, designed to conceal his true plans.



The culmination of the Russian problem has now been created personally by Putin - already by the fact that he puts his political demands above any expediency: military, social, economic.


We don’t have a strategy - there are some global requirements that demand positive reports and plans only in the style of "now we will achieve" [hence the "analytics", rather than real analytics].

As recently as two weeks ago, there was hope that the current crisis would force the country's top leadership to take a responsible step back, assess the situation, and look for real solutions to the current situation.


But instead we see the behavior of a player who has had a breakdown in the excitement and is trying to win back his lost bets at any cost. And there is no one to stop him, and his environment indulges in it [you should see how even our people grovel (in the FSB)]…


And it is Kadyrov who has now popped up from this theme. He cries out louder than anyone else, he is yelling about the adventure on Kiev louder than anyone else.

Right now he's getting ready to make a breakthrough, which will not be easy for us to counter.

And a lot of forces in the coming chaos may try to quickly join the "strong hand" (Kadyrov) that will help them not lose the old, and also bite off the new.

The fact that after their victory this strong hand of theirs will beautifully let them slide onto the knife – that notion will be somewhere out there, in the "wonderful far away.”


But we are not allowed to talk about this today. We can’t write such reports. Prohibited from assessing the global situation. Do you remember, as in Galich's story?

“And you will breed the wolves on earth,

And teach them to wag their tail,

And that it will come at a cost –

Well that’s, you must understand – later…”


So Kadyrov is getting ready for this "later" now, for all intents and purposes. In the meantime, we're going to catch some traitors, so there's that...


I don't see any more options for preventing this and I'm moving into the mode of declaration.”

Putin intended to attack Japan in the summer of 2021, before copying that plan to invade Ukraine instead - 10th letter from the Wind of Change inside the FSB

My translation of the 10th #FSBletters from the #WindofChange inside the FSB to Vladimir Osechkin, a Russian human-rights activist exiled in France. Dated: March 17. Subject: #JAPAN. Please share far & wide.

Please listen to this audio as it explains the context and the genesis of the #FSBletters. It will help you understand the prism through which these letters are to be read. You will understand in real human terms why #WindofChange writes to Vladimir.

As always, my comments for clarification are in (parenthesis). #WindofChange's parenthesis are in [brackets]. So, let's roll:

"Vladimir, hello!


I will now supply information on events that occurred six months ago. In this instance it’s easier: I can afford provide specifics which the experts will be able to cross-verify, but details which won’t risk me being identified.


In August 2021, Russia was quite seriously preparing for a localized military conflict with Japan. Confidence that the countries would enter the stage of acute confrontation and even war was high. Why Ukraine was chosen for war in the end [the scenario was not changed much] is for others to answer.


So, August 2021. The Eastern Military District [VVO] was supplied with Mi-8MTR-1 helicopters, equipped with the "Rychag-AV" (Рычаг-АВ) electronic warfare system, the FSB declassified the data from the interrogation of Otozo Yamada, commander-in-chief of the Japanese army during World War II, the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan happened immediately after the US troops withdrew, damaging the reputation of the US Democratic Party. Events that don't seem to belong on the same page.


But let's start with the main point. The key stumbling block between Moscow and Tokyo is the Kuril Islands.


For Japan, there is a cornerstone of its modern geopolitics here: its status as a World War II loser still prevents the Japanese from having an official military force, a foreign intelligence service and a number of other things. For the Land of the Rising Sun, the return of the Kuril Islands would actually mean a revision [or even cancellation] of its postwar status.


For Moscow - the Kurils are a bargaining chip. It's a bargaining chip with Japan but even with China: The Heavenly Kingdom (China) takes any attempted revisions to the postwar agreements very negatively, and a potential victory for Tokyo in the dispute over the Kurils is unacceptable to Beijing. It is so unacceptable that China would easily complicate Russia's life for making such a "gift."


Former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was already placing a strong emphasis on two things: trying to "negotiate" with Russia over the Kuril issue and reforming the country's intelligence service. “Reform" meant creating its own foreign intelligence service along the lines of Britain's MI6. Historically, Japan's military intelligence has always been at a high level, but after the defeat in World War II it was simply abolished at the behest of the victors.


And if Putin was still trying to intrigue the Japanese at the end of July (2021) with an "unprecedentedly interesting" offer on the Kuril Islands, on the backdrop of Afghanistan everything began to change rapidly. But what is the connection?


First, I will highlight specifically what began to change. Well, we declassified the interrogation data of Otozo Yamada, commander-in-chief of the Japanese army during World War II.


Initially, as early as August 8 the Russian mass media were rather stingy in their comments on the news: they claimed that Japan had been preparing for war with the USSR since 1938, plans of the attack were being hatched, diversions were made, etc.


But on August 16, the Russian media literally exploded at the same time, discussing the declassified documents in a completely different tone:

The Japanese allegedly conducted terrible biological experiments on Soviet prisoners, and treated Soviet prisoners extremely badly. The details of the plague lice that were used to torture prisoners were scrawled all over the place.

Russia Today, the main mouthpiece of international propaganda, also joined in.


The FSB actually had the task to launch an information campaign against Japan in Russian society. Abruptly, suddenly and almost unexpectedly. That is, if you don’t take into account the events in Afghanistan.

The Americans obviously didn't get it right, at minimum with this picture:

The regime they supported managed to collapse before the Americans even got out.


Taliban, who met no resistance, even slowed down towards the end, so as not to drown in the shortage of middle-ranking managerial personnel needed to wield the acquired authority.

Barack Obama even turned off comments on his social networks, tired of the barrage of criticism directed at him.

And we are not even discussing the U.S.’ possible game of geopolitics - we are talking about image and the picture of what was happening. [Trump, of course, immediately attacked Biden in the information field]


And this is where the question of Japan for the United States [through the Russian eyes] was opportune.


But before that, let's go back to the subject that the Russian Air Force was aggressively deploying the Mi-8MTPR-1 helicopters during the same period.

If we discuss the technical characteristics of the Electronic warefare "Rychag-AV" on these helicopters, this system is capable of interfering with the electronic radar of the enemy over the radius of hundreds of kilometers.

And the reason for such actions is the fear of American missile systems, which very soon could have been very close to Russian borders (around Japan). "Strike first" and all that kind of stuff.

The U.S. did have plans in this region.

The priority, of course, is the growing confrontation with China, and the peak of this confrontation is scheduled for 2023, when Chinese leader Xi Jinping will seek re-election.

To make clear, Xi Jinping is a key opponent of the democratic camp in the United States, so the victory of the head of the Communist Party of China in the election will make the confrontation between the United States and China very hot.


This is why it was seen as extremely important for Washington not just to get Japan's support, but to delegate to it a rather complicated function in confrontation with China.

Tokyo does not have a burning desire cross certain red lines with Beijing, but...

If the United States makes the most significant [or, more precisely, visible] contribution to the Russo-Japanese conflict [even if it is quite local), namely, a victory for the Japanese side, the Japanese side will automatically owe too much to Washington.

And Washington would’ve shifted the attention of domestic audiences from failure in Afghanistan to success in Asia.


A caveat here: the Russian authorities [as You refer to them, PolitBureau 2.0] really believe that all the countries around them, if they cooperate with the United States, want to attack us.

For Japan, the very notion of "victory" in such a hypothetical conflict could consist of only one thing: the signing of an international treaty that would effectively "end" the status as the capitulating country (from WW2) to allow some outcomes to be reconsidered. These outcomes may be a pure formality, but the Kuril Islands look absolutely perfect.

At minimum, to escalate the situation to the maximum, threaten war and then starting negotiations was acceptable (in Russia). Just like prior to the war with Ukraine, which did not prevent the war.

Russia is lagging in this geographical direction (East Asia), so “silencing the far-fast sky” – is a task capable of providing Moscow considerable points.

And the Afghan events have apparently finally convinced the Kremlin that the U.S. will somewhat speed up the process of resolving the Kuril question.

The likelihood of a military conflict was considered non-zero, and there was active spin in the Russian information space against Japan.

The bet was placed on the fact that the Japanese specialized in brutal biological experiments, showed inhumanity, and had a disposition for Nazism.

And they should have demilitarized after the war, but they violate these regulations, creating risks for Russia.


Subjects that made headlines: Russia saved the world from biological war, declassified evidence of preparations for an attack by Japan on the USSR, etc.

There wasn’t much faith in a victorious blitzkrieg in the event of possible military clashes.

Apparently, that is why the war at that time and place did not start [at that time - the summer of 2021 - no one believed in it, nor in the war with Ukraine].


But on the whole, war was inevitable for Russia due to the maniacal desire for war by the leadership (Putin is not alone in this). This has become definitively obvious today; it was simply an underestimation of the level of insanity at the time.


And there are many-many more such references, which in August 2021 were in the Russian media.


And now the bulk of the combat-ready units from that direction have been redeployed to Ukraine.”


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Wednesday, April 20, 2022

Food shortage, luring Ukraine to counter-attack Russia, mass-cleansing of the General Staff, plan for Odessa - 17th letter from the Wind of Change inside the FSB

My translation of the 17th #FSBletters from the #WindofChange inside the FSB to Vladimir Osechkin. Dated 4/18. Topics: Global food shortage, luring Ukraine to counter-attack Russia, impending mass-cleansing of the General Staff, Odessa, chaos surrounding the missing & economy. Please share far & wide.

Please listen to this audio as it explains the context and the genesis of the #FSBletters. It will help you understand the prism through which these letters are to be read. You will understand in real human terms why #WindofChange writes to Vladimir.

As always, my comments for clarification are in (parenthesis). #WindofChange's parenthesis are in [brackets]. So, let's roll:

“I’ll say it upfront – I can’t provide 100% accurate prognosis because the situation is so dynamic that it’s difficult to keep up. Besides, there’s often a rift between plans & actualization.

This explains why there have been no direct explosions of residential buildings [so far], confined to shelling by "Ukrainian" helicopters/DRG of certain vacant areas and non-residential buildings.

I will try to break the letter into themes [or rather, I will try to collect a number of themes in the letter].

1. Using migrants for blackmail and the unexpected flip side of the coin.

As I wrote earlier, the main bet in the protracted war with the Western world is the use of migrants as blackmail (against the West): by knocking out Ukraine's grain exports and refusing to export potash fertilizers, Russia effectively launches a scenario of hunger riots and widespread migration from developing countries.

In theory, the window of opportunity for blackmail is as follows: give more grain to developing countries - reduce the flow of migrants. Naturally, all this could be in response to mutual concessions from the West.

But already we are facing opposition from the West: almost all developing countries have taken a neutral position in the war with Ukraine. In the current geopolitical situation, this can be credited to Russia. But such a game of hunger [and Ukraine's fuel reserves and grain export logistics are now being destroyed very systematically and precisely] can turn developing countries against us much earlier than we reach the point of possible blackmail. And the West is actively conducting this "explanatory work" right now.

2. Belgorod Oblast.

In the current situation, there are political decisions and there are military decisions. From the military point of view, allowing Ukraine a "sudden" offensive with a significant advance on Belgorod Oblast is unacceptable.

From the political point of view – quite possible.

At the moment, we are fighting internally to push through an option where, in the event of a serious military defeat in the Donbass direction, we can give the AFU (Armed Forces of Ukraine) a "corridor to enter" the Belgorod region. The corridor would look like a total surrender of a piece of territory, which would allow to:

- Demonstrate a picture of the risk of war on Russian territory; (to the Russian population)

- Move toward total mobilization without regard to what problems it will bring;

- Create a "terrorist precedent" in all the territory controlled by the AFU [they (Russians) plan to give them only part of the region].

This could block the "Bucha factor" for the outside observer, at the same time distracting the internal observer from the problems in the economy. The main thing is to get them in - explosions and all the other delights will be in abundance, and the military knuckleheads from the General Staff will be made responsible for this.

This cannot be done with Crimea, precisely for political reasons. The military is against such approaches in principle, but the military is a separate issue; they are now acting as losers to some extent.

3. Military. The question of corruption in the army gets zero attention until after the end of the war. This does not mean that everybody has forgotten about everything - even investigations are being carefully carried out, but for now they will not touch on the old stuff. It is left for after the war.

Taking care of the so-called "unreliables" (those in the Russian military that do not support Putin) is much more urgent now, especially in the command staff. It is the military that now represents the main threat to stability [not my personal assessment - I am stating the assessment of the Service (FSB) and the country's leadership], and the scale of the threat is growing, as they say, both wide and deep.

The number of unreliables is growing, the level of radicalization of sentiments is increasing. Military counterintelligence alone will not suffice here - the military is not a closed system – its contacts [and a certain political weight] penetrate deep into society. Further, the military, by definition, has both the organizational structure and the human resources, as well as the necessary foundation.

Right now, the situation with them is infinitely far from a riot, but in the case of the expected "military contingencies" you can get a bunch of very adult problems.

I don't know what the final decision on them will be, but I estimate the likelihood of "isolation" through both direct imprisonment and dismissal with all the problems written off on the dismissed as high.

The fact that dossiers are now being prepared for the lion's share of those on the command staff to put them in jail with a beautiful pretext - I confirm.

Before they give the order to roll back the military operation [the reasons are not important], they will have to clean the "unreliable command staff", sometimes to a bloody crust, and sometimes even to the white bone.

4. Ukraine, the southern front. From the leadership's point of view, Mykolaiv is in some ways becoming as much of an irritant as Mariupol. So far there is no clear solution, and the cost of military pressure is prohibitively high. The calculation that Mykolaiv will break prior to the advancing (Russian) forces will break belongs to the same lists of calculations regarding capture of Kiev in 3 days.

But there is Odessa. From the military point of view, everything there is also extremely sad for our side - now we can say that the storm that blocked the landing earlier did not so much save Odessa as it saved our marines. The military counterintelligence of the Ukrainians [and NATO helps them - this is a fact] is a separate misfortune for us. Or rather, it is a misfortune for the military, which had its own plans to eliminate a number of key individuals. But there aren’t any particular direct military solutions there: the obviousness of the failure of a possible breakthrough operation to Transnistria is now apparent even to the most desperate.

In Odessa, however, they (Russian side) are betting on chaotization on all fronts except the military. Fact is the counterintelligence of the Odessa SBU (Ukrainian Security Service) is the weakest of the regional ones in Ukraine. In addition, the economic management of the Odessa region is conducted on the residual principle, i.e., it is not conducted at all.

That is why it is Odessa that will bear the brunt of the disruption: lists of names that are not on the guarded list, but whose simultaneous elimination could cause social and political chaos, are now being prepared.

The task is not to eliminate influential "enemies of Russia" - the task is to completely chaoticize the local space, to rock the situation and to start a mechanism of conflicts between everyone.

Our people (in the FSB) have already felt out Odessa: sabotage against military targets is almost unrealizable, but everything else is almost without resistance, and the local SBU is incapable of dealing with issues unrelated to smuggling and customs.

5. Kadyrov. He lurks and continues to establish his game. We are also starting to move on him from different sides, he understands that. Who, to whom, and how will do what in the end is still a trick question.

6. Missing Persons (Russian military losses in Ukraine). This problem will rise to full prominence after the war, but its scale is insanely large. The missing are now the main category in terms of current losses, with the numbers jumping around so much that the real situation is unknown.

Modern warfare is such that the heavy weapons will sometimes make it impossible to find physical bodies.

Many are indeed dead and just not evacuated. Some in captivity, some escaped, some have lost contact and may still return. The picture in this sense is the same for all agencies.

The Ukrainian side is conducting active work to establish a list of identities of those they have captured.

But no one knows anything (in Russia) about the overwhelming majority of the missing people - this data is classified and concealed like the top secret of the country.

Recognition of the dead will be made with extreme reluctance, and one should not look for malicious intent here: if there is a chance that a person may be found alive (if Russia jumps the gun on recognizing the missing as dead), then military bureaucrats will have a headache on their hands. Let us take the most cynical example:

the relatives will be paid compensation as is if the person is deceased, but the person will return, for example, with a serious wound, after having been found somewhere in captivity.

Ask the relatives to "return the money they received" and reclassify everything?

It’s cynical, but for the bureaucratic system it is also unsolvable, which means that even after the war people will still be on the list of the missing for a very, very long time. And there are thousands and thousands of people missing.

7. Overall. Nabiullina (Head of the Russian Central Bank) has already confirmed aloud what I wrote in the very first letters: by the end of May we are ending the "good old days" and moving into a new economic model. Which does not yet exist, which has not yet been invented, but for which we will pay a fantastic price for trying to create.

Import warehouses will be depleted of everything accumulated in the pre-war period by that time (end of May), whether the government will risk unlocking the strategic reserves - we wonder ourselves.

If you unpack it (the strategic reserves), up to another six months of time appears. That phase (the extra 6 months) would be on the level of the early '90s. And then... I don't even want to talk about it. And there is no point in looking that far ahead: earlier we tried to plan for years ahead, now it would be a success if we could predict a month out.

(END OF TRANSLATION of the 17th #FSBletters from the #WindofChange)